India appoints its higher judges through the collegium system — a body of senior judges choosing future judges, with the government largely confined to a consultative role. No other major democracy does it this way: everywhere else, elected officials appoint judges, with varying judicial input. Born of the Emergency’s trauma and judicial creativity, the collegium is fiercely defended as independence’s guarantee and fiercely attacked as undemocratic opacity. This is how it works and why it endures.

What is the collegium?

The collegium is not in the constitution’s text — it was created by Supreme Court interpretation. For Supreme Court appointments, it comprises the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most judges; for High Courts, the CJI plus the two senior-most judges, consulting the concerned High Court collegium. It recommends names to the government, which may return a recommendation once for reconsideration but must appoint if the collegium reiterates. Memoranda of procedure govern the process, but deliberations are secret: no minutes, no published criteria, no explanations for supersessions.

How was the collegium born?

The system emerged from the judiciary-executive wars of the 1970s-90s. The constitution says judges are appointed by the President in consultation with the CJI — and for decades, governments treated consultation as non-binding, superseding inconvenient judges (the 1973 supersession of three senior judges for the pliant A.N. Ray) and punishing independent ones during the Emergency. The First Judges Case (1981) upheld executive primacy; the Second Judges Case (1993) reversed it, reading consultation as concurrence — the CJI’s view, formed with senior colleagues, would prevail. The Third Judges Case (1998) formalised the collegium. Trauma, not theory, built the system: judges who remembered the Emergency would never again trust politicians with appointments.

Why do critics want it replaced?

The case against is formidable. Opacity: secret deliberations, no criteria, unexplained choices — the world’s most powerful judiciary appoints itself behind closed doors. Nepotism: the collegium era coincided with the rise of judicial dynasties, the uncle-judge syndrome critics decry. Democratic deficit: in every other democracy, elected representatives have the final say; India’s judges alone decide. Inefficiency: vacancies persist for years as collegium and government spar. Parliament tried to replace it with the National Judicial Appointments Commission in 2014 — a body including the law minister and eminent persons — but the Court struck the NJAC down in 2015 as violating judicial independence, a judgment critics called judges protecting their turf.

How do other countries appoint judges?

Comparison sharpens the debate.

• United States: presidents nominate, the Senate confirms — transparently political, for better and worse.
• United Kingdom: an independent Judicial Appointments Commission selects on merit; the Lord Chancellor has limited veto.
• South Africa: a broadly representative Judicial Service Commission interviews candidates publicly.
• Germany: parliamentary committees elect constitutional judges by supermajority.
• India alone: judges appointing judges, with the executive reduced to objecting.

The collegium survives because its defenders’ core argument still resonates: in a polity where governments punish independent institutions, judicial primacy in appointments is independence’s last line. Whether that justifies self-selection in perpetuity — or whether transparency reforms could square the circle — remains Indian democracy’s unresolved institutional question.

Reform proposals on the table

Ideas for fixing the collegium without returning to executive dominance abound. Transparency advocates want published criteria, recorded reasons and disclosed voting; merit reformers propose wider talent searches beyond the bar’s senior echelons; structural reformers suggest a commission with judicial majority but executive and civil-society participation — essentially an NJAC redesigned to survive basic-structure review. The Court itself has inched toward openness, publishing some collegium resolutions. Whether incremental transparency can satisfy critics, or whether only structural change will do, is the live question.

Do judges’ relatives get favoured?

Critics allege an uncle-judge syndrome of dynastic appointments; defenders note many collegium appointees come from outside judicial families, and demand data over anecdote.

FAQs

Who sits on the Supreme Court collegium?

The Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most Supreme Court judges, who collectively recommend appointments and transfers.

Can the government reject a collegium recommendation?

It can return a name once for reconsideration, but if the collegium reiterates the recommendation, the appointment must be made.

What was the NJAC?

The 2014 National Judicial Appointments Commission, meant to replace the collegium with a body including the law minister — struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015.

Compiled by the Khabar 24h Editorial Desk from publicly available sources.